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A Prisoner's Right to a Protective Transfer
from State to Federal Prison
The considerable interest shown for prisoners' rights in recent
years signifies a growing perception that one way to test the bounds of
the rights and privileges ostensibly accorded all individuals under the
Constitution is to gauge their application to those who have forfeited
many rights and privileges by committing crimes meriting incarceration.
The law's respect for the rights of prisoners ultimately attests to the
law's respect for the rights of free citizens. One area which has not
been commented on involves state prisoners who must be placed in
solitary confinement because of danger to their lives and not because
of disciplinary reasons. These are the inmates who will surely encounter
physical attack if they are allowed to mingle with the general prison
populace either because they are particularly susceptible to homosexual
assault or because they have committed some act that outrages a sizable
group of prisoners, such as informing the police or stirring racial hatred
or harming a popular political figure. These prisoners may, at the
discretion of the prison officials, be transferred to a federal prison; but
often such transfers are approved only if the families of these prisoners
will pay the cost of maintaining them. This practice of conditioning
transfers on financial ability warrants attention because it poses serious
constitutional problems.
This practice has not been sanctioned by any court, nor has it been
specifically authorized by any legislative authority.' The only statute.
which arguably provides such authority is a federal statute which
authorizes the Attorney General, after the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons has certified that proper and adequate treatment facilities and
personnel are available, to
contract with the proper officials of a State or Territory for the
custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of
persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such State
or Territory: Provided, That any such contract shall provide for
I In those few states, notably Alaska and Maine, where the legislature has enacted
statutes regarding the transfer of state prisoners to federal institutions, the burden of
defraying the cost of maintenance is not placed on the families of the prisoners, but on
the state. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.060 (a) (1962), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 707(1964).
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reimbursing the United States in full for all costs or other expenses
involved2
The statute can be read as sanctioning private financing if only because
it does not prohibit such an arrangement. However, the legislative
history indicates this was not the intent. The statute, enacted in 1952,
grew out of frequent requests by state officials that the Bureau of
Prisons undertake the custody of those who needed specialized treat-
ment, such as drug addicts, or who needed corrective guidance and
training, such as juvenile offenders, but were unable to receive such treat-
ment and training in state facilities. At the time of passage no one
envisaged placing on the families of prisoners the burden of reimbursing
the federal government for maintaining those prisoners.' The cost
burden was clearly allocated to the state.
However, in practice the burden has been allocated to prisoners or
their families, regardless of the scheme envisioned by the act. Given
the fact that the federal statute demands reimbursing the federal
government for the care and custody of transferred state prisoners, it
is easy to speculate why the burden would be shifted from the state to
the families of the prisoners." This practice is but one method of
relieving an inadequately financed corrections department.5 Whatever
the explanation, the practice of removing state prisoners to federal
institutions at personal rather than public expense somehow started and
now exists. Such a practice is troubling, for it dearly discriminates
against those prisoners whose families cannot afford the cost of main-
taining them at a federal prison. Prisoners lacking such financial sup-
port must endure the rigors of solitary confinement for purely pro-
tective, nondisciplinary reasons while those with financial resources can
seek transfer to a federal prison and, if allowed to do so, escape re-
strictive isolation in state prisons. The issue is whether this discrimina-
tion against the financially unresourceful prisoner rises to the level of
a constitutional violation. However, before reaching the constitutional
implications of this question, a preliminary question must be explored.
It is whether a state prisoner, given a bona fide reason, such as having
218 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
a See 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1420. Nor did that issue arise in the two
court decisions based on this statute. Duncan v. Madigan, 278 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919, rehearing denied, 366 U.S. 947, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 905
(1961); Dwyer v. State, 449 P.2d 282 (Alas. 1969).
4 Perhaps state prison officials could not afford transferring those who faced pro-
tracted solitary confinement for merely protective reasons; or perhaps they were simply
not authorized by their legislatures to use state funds for such a purpose-drug addicts
and juvenile offenders having higher claims to consideration.
5 American Friends Service Comm., Struggle for Justice 11 (1971).
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to remain in solitary confinement for fear of his life and thus having to
forego the opportunity for training, education, work, recreation, social
contact, and other activities, can compel his transfer to a federal prison.
There is no state or federal statute that confers the right to be
transferred, nor is there any judicial decision that recognizes such a
right. In those states where there is statutory authority to transfer
prisoners, the initiative and the decision are entirely within the discre-
tion of the state officials. Courts have consistently rejected any claim
that the opportunity to transfer is a basic right.' A prisoner has neither
the constitutional right to remain in a particular prison, nor the right
to be sent to a particular prison.'
The difficulty of demanding transfer is further enhanced because
some courts deny their own authority or power to designate the place
of imprisonment.' Some courts may hesitate to direct the state Attorney
General to commit a state prisoner to a federal institution because of
the federal statute which confers such power on the U.S. Attorney
General.1" One federal court, however, did order the director of a
medical center for federal prisoners to transfer a prisoner to a certain
type of federal prison. In Ricketts v. Ciccone a federal prisoner sought
transfer on a writ of habeas corpus to a prison in a climate of low
humidity because of chronic rhinitis caused by an allergy to a certain
mold. By previous order he was to be transferred to a prison in a climate
of high humidity where the mold could flourish.1 The court held that
the transfer initially ordered was unreasonable given the circumstances
and directed that the prisoner be given the most suitable medical treat-
ment reasonably available, which was "allergic desensitization in a
climate of low humidity." 2 Here, the court ordered the director of the
medical center to transfer the prisoner to an institution in a climate of
low humidity. The court reached this decision because the requested
treatment was a needed one, not because it was desirable. To invoke
this case in support of an argument for transfer, it would be necessary
0 See Peiffer Petition, 193 Pa. Super. 476, 166 A.2d 325 (1960) (transfer from a
state prison to a county jail) ; Kohler v. Nicholson, 117 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1941) (dic-
tum) (release from federal prison).
7 Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 1972).
8 Peiffer Petition, 193 Pa. Super. 476, 166 A.2d 325 (1960). Accord, Stokes v. In-
stitutional Bd., 357 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1973). "[T]he inmate has no right to con-
finement in one institution as opposed to another." Id. at 705 (dictum).
9 Thogmartin v. Moseley, 313 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D. Kan. 169), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1178
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970).
10 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1970) provides that the court conmit a person who has
been duly convicted to the Attorney General, who shall designate the place of confinement.
11371 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
221d. at 1256.
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to show that the rationale for the transfer is founded on a need for
essential treatment, not merely on a desire for better treatment. It
should be noted that no question of jurisdiction arose in this case
because the transfer was from one federal prison to another. As such,
the problem noted above, respecting a state court's authority over the
administration of federal prisons, did not exist.
To overcome the judicial barrier against granting a transfer, it
must appear that transfer is the only reasonable relief in a given situa-
tion. However, the encrusted reluctance of courts to interfere with the
administration of prison systems must be overcome even to launch this
argument since many courts tend to view the problems of confinement
as problems that must be left to the discretion of prison officials." In
recent years, though, some courts have shown a willingness to repudiate
the "hands-off" policy toward prisons and to supervise important penal
reforms.
This shift in attitude has sprung from a reaffirmation of the idea
that prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights when incarcer-
ated.14 While prisoners may be divested of their rights to vote, to
travel, to associate freely among others, they may not, without the
showing of a compelling state interest, be divested of their right to
worship and other first amendment freedoms." Moreover, the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment shield
them "from unconstitutional action on the part of prison authorities
carried out under color of State law."'0 Therefore, the first area of
constitutional inquiry is whether protective solitary confinement itself
violates a constitutional right of a prisoner.
Solitary confinement may trigger judicial intervention in prison
Is See Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971). In Newkirk v. Butler, 364
F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court said: "Outside [the] area of constitu-
tionally protected rights lies the realm of day-to-day prison discipline or administration
in which courts and particularly federal courts are traditionally reluctant to interfere."
See also Parker v. McKeithen, 330 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. La. 1971). But see Parker v.
McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974), vacating 330 F. Supp. 435, supra. In this case
the court said:
While it is true that federal courts are usually reluctant to interfere in matters
of prison administration . . . it can no longer be correctly asserted that the
federal courts are unwilling in all situations to review the actions of state prison
administrators to determine the existence of possible violations of constitutional
rights.
488 F.2d at 556 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
'14 Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659 (M.D. Ala. 1973) ; Sewell v. Pegelow,
291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
t5 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).t1 Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333
(1968). Accord, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) ; Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
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affairs if there is a showing that an administrator's action seriously
impinges on the prisoner's statutory or constitutional rights.' When
courts find such abuse of discretion, they usually speak in terms of
extraordinary situations which reflect "subhuman conditions,"8 or
"shocking deprivation of fundamental rights,"' 9 or conditions "so foul,
so inhuman, and so violative of basic concepts ot decency."2 In the
absence of such exceptional circumstances the case may not be heard
with sympathy. According to one federal court, only "with respect to
persons confined under the criminal law . . . . [a] tolerable living
environment is now guaranteed by law."21
In keeping with the judicial philosophy that only the foulest con-
ditions of solitary confinement require judicial intervention is the posi-
tion that denying an inmate the usual amenities of prison does not
warrant constitutional scrutiny. In Breece v. Swenson, a maximum
security prisoner confined in solitary could find no redress for the de-
privation of his alleged right to participate in recreational activities,
sports, movies, and television, to pursue academic and avocational
interests, to order books, to work at his job assignment and earn monthly
wages, or to possess or use his own personal property.22
A prisoner who is in solitary confinement for protective reasons
may present a more sympathetic cause than did the inmate in Breece,
who was confined for punitive reasons. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
a court would compel his transfer, because in both cases prison officials
can point to legitimate penal needs that justify the discriminatory treat-
ment. Thus, the authorities would be able to meet the due process re-
quirement that there must be proof that the isolation serves legitimate
penal concerns.23 One court has said that whenever "security or some
other legitimate interest of the state so requires," there is nothing to
prevent the solitary confinement of a prisoner.2
17 Cf. Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 278 (D. Utah 1973) ; Jones v. Witten-
berg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1971), modified, 330 F. Supp. 707, aff'd sub noam.
Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
1s Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
10 Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1971).
20 Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), quotcd in Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
21 New York St Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
22332 F. Supp. 837, 843 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
23 See Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In this case prison
officials were unable to offer proof that the isolation of a prisoner served legitimate penal
concerns.
24Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1380 (D. Del. 1974). See also Rivera v.
Fogg, 371 F. Supp. 938, 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1974): "[S]pecial corfinement was not punish-
ment but separation from the rest of the population because of a belief that such segrega-
1974]
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The courts have also been unresponsive to the argument that solitary
confinement denies a prisoner access to the rehabilitative programs of
the prison. This has been true even in states where rehabilitation has
been explicitly recognized by the legislature as a purpose of imprison-
ment." In Wilson v. Kelley, despite the existence of such a statute, a
federal court held that, excepting the constitutional rights which follow a
man into confinement, no duty is absolutely owed a prisoner other than to
exercise ordinary care for his protection and to keep him safe and free
from harm." In McLamore v. State a state supreme court said, "Cer-
tain constitutional rights follow a person into confinement, but there is
no constitutional duty imposed on any government entity to educate or
rehabilitate him."2 In Powell v. Texas, the Supreme Court by way of
dictum said, "This Court has never held that anything in the Constitu-
tion requires that penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve thera-
peutic or rehabilitative effects." '28 No case, in fact, has ever held that a
prisoner has a constitutional right to rehabilitation.
In Holt v. Sarver, a federal court held that the failure of the
Arkansas prison system to provide any meaningful rehabilitative pro-
gram was one significant factor leading to the finding that the system
was unconstitutional. 9 Nevertheless, the fact that the imprisonment of
offenders serves purposes other than rehabilitation, such as the deter-
rence of crime and the protection of society, is not conducive to the
recognition of a constitutional right to be offered a rehabilitation
program.
tion was essential to the security of the entire institution, as well as petitioner's own
protection."
25 See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18: "The penal code shall be founded on the prin-
ciples of reformation, and not of vindictive justice." In Indiana, furthermore, the direc-
tor of the division of classification and treatment within the department of correction is
empowered to supervise a "program of human relations and of prison education designed
in the broadest sense to bring about the rehabilitation of the inmates." The statute goes
on to say:
The objective of these programs shall be the return of [the] inmates to society
with a more wholesome attitude toward living and with a desire to support
themselves and their dependents through honest labor. To this end, each inmate
shall be given a program of education which is deemed most likely to further
the process of rehabilitation ....
IND. ANN. STAT. § 11-1-1.1-26 (Code ed. 1973) (bracketed word not in [1971] Ind. Acts
638).
29 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd inem., 393 U.S. 266 (1968). See also,
Smith v. Schnecldoth, 414 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1969), in which the court rejected the claim
that the failure to provide rehabilitative vocational training constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.
27257 S.C. 413, 423, 186 S.E.2d 250, 255 (1972).
28 392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968).
29 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). Accord, Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub norn. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
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A prisoner, however, does have the right to personal security.
While the law may take away a prisoner's liberty and impose "a duty
of servitude and observance of discipline for his regulation and that of
other prisoners," the law "does not deny his right to personal security
against unlawful invasion."" Courts recognize this right to some degree
of protection from attacks by fellow inmates as a constitutional right,
based on the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.3 ' A prisoner may allege that the duty that is owed him of
providing security from physical violence is best fulfilled by transferring
him to another prison. But, where prison officials can protect the prisoner
by placing him in solitary confinement, it is questionable whether the
more troublesome recourse of carrying out a transfer would be com-
pelled.
A more effective argument that can be made for transfer under
the circumstances described is that solitary confinement for protective
reasons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment. Such confinement is not the punishment for the
offense committed, for the prisoner was not sentenced to maximum
isolation. Nor is the confinement a disciplinary measure for offenses
committed while in prison. It is a protective meascare that amounts to
excessive punishment because the prisoner is thereby prevented from
engaging in the normal activities of other prisoners,. The keeping of a
prisoner in solitary for protective reasons may constitute what in the
words of the Supreme Court is "a punishment out of all proportion
to the offense [which] may bring it within the ba'i against 'cruel and
unusual punishments.' "32 In Jordan v. Fitzharris, a federal court de-
clared that a punishment may be cruel and unusuail when it goes be-
yond what is necessary to achieve a legitimate penal aim. 3
To be sure, protection of a prisoner is a legitimate end. However,
solitary confinement may nevertheless run afoul of the eighth amend-
ment if the aim of protecting a prisoner from physical violence can be
met by means other than solitary confinement. Retriction to quarters
or segregation in a special area, for example, offer,; similar protection.
But if these other means are unavailable in a state prison, the prisoner
should be transferred to an institution where they are available. More-
30 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), ccrt. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
31 Walker v. McCune, 363 F. Supp. 254, 256 (E.D. Va. 1973) ; Penn v. Oliver, 351
F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972) ; Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d ;.04, 308 (8th Cir. 1971).
32 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
33 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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over, even if they are available, the prisoner should still be transferred
because he would otherwise be denied, as he would in solitary confine-
ment, the opportunity to participate in the usual activities of his fellow
prisoners.
Whether this method of argument will be successful is not known.
The courts have said that excessive punishment is unconstitutional."
But the courts have not said that the protective isolation of a prisoner
constitutes excessive punishment, even if isolation entails the deprivation
of certain privileges that are uniquely his as a prisoner. It is not likely
that a court will so hold, for the courts have consistently upheld the
validity of solitary confinement per se when it has been shown to be
necessary for proper prison administration.35 In O'Brien v. Moriarty, a
federal appeals court regarded segregated confinement which did not
involve intolerable conditions as "a necessary tool of prison discipline,
both to punish infractions and to control and perhaps protect inmates
whose presence within the general population would create unmanage-
able risks."" What hope the prisoner has in this situation must be ex-
tracted from that pregnant "perhaps."
Having reviewed the arguments that a prisoner seeking transfer
could make, it is necessary to return to the question with which this
note began: whether there is unlawful discrimination against those
state prisoners whose families cannot afford to have them transferred
to and maintained at a federal institution. The argument on behalf of
these prisoners is that they are denied equal protection by an invidious
practice of state prison authorities. This claim requires an initial deter-
mination of whether the challenged classification is inherently "suspect."
If it is not, the court must determine whether the individual interest
affected by the difference in treatment is "fundamental." 37 If the class
is suspect or if the interest is fundamental, then a compelling govern-
mental interest in the challenged activity must be shown. If it is not
fundamental, then only a rational relationship must be shown between
that activity and a justifiable state purpose.38
In this case, the classification is apparently based on wealth; for
only those whose families can afford the cost of transfer and main-
34 Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) ; Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
35 See Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107-08 (7th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 192 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
36489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
3 7 Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 620, 625-26 (W.D. Wis. 1973). Cf. San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973).
38 See Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 620, 625 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
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tenance have the opportunity to take advantage of the prison officials'
discretion. But the Supreme Court has never declared that wealth is a
suspect classification like race, creed, or color. Nor has the Court ever
demanded absolute equality between rich and poor. As the Court has
recently said: "[W]here wealth is involved, the Equal Protection
Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advant-
ages."30
Although the Supreme Court has found nothing suspect in a
classification which differentiates between districts according to wealth
for purposes of school financing," the Court has traditionally been more
stringent with wealth classifications involving the judicial system4' or
the criminal justice system." Williams v. Illinois declared unconstitu-
tional the practice of incarcerating people for periods longer than the
maximum sentence permissible under the statute creating the offense
because of an inability to pay fines which were imposed as part of the
punishment.43 The Court declared such a practice to be "an imper-
missible discrimination that rests on ability to pay.""
The situation presented by prison officials allowing an inmate to
transfer only if he is financially able to bear the costs involved is
similar to that presented by Williams. Solitary confinement was not
deemed a necessary result of conviction by the terms of the judgment
and sentence or by the statute creating the offense." Moreover, by offer-
ing to transfer a prisoner if he will pay the costs, the corrections officials
have implicitly admitted that such confinement is not a necessary conse-
quence of his conviction. The situation runs contrary to the Williams
prohibition against exacting a more severe punishment just because of
indigency.
Therefore, while it can be said, as a general proposition, that wealth
is not a suspect classification, it should be remembered that distinctions
based upon wealth have been disallowed in areas which either directly or
39 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
40 Id. at 28. But cf. id. at 25 n.60.
41 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), which held it was violative
of due process to deny persons, because of inability to pay court iees, access to the courts
for purpose of obtaining a divorce. Part of the rationale in Boddie was that the state
had monopoly control over both marriage and legal dissolution of marriage. Such
monopoly control is equally true of the criminal laws and prisons. If monopoly control
is the reason for not allowing discriminations based on wealth, Boddie is also precedent
for not allowing the state to condition transfers on ability to pay. But cf. United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
42See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
4 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
" Id. at 241.
4r See notes 31-32 supra & text accompanying.
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indirectly concern the judicial system or the criminal justice system.
Since the incarceration of a convicted person is the ultimate consequence
of the criminal justice system, the courts may be less tolerant of dis-
tinctions related to wealth in that area than they are in the area of school
financing.
Assuming, however, that no suspect classification can be found, it
is necessary to see if the right claimed by the prisoner is fundamental.
In this case, no such right is involved under the Supreme Court's latest
test characterizing "fundamental interests" as limited to those "explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."4 Nothing in the Consti-
tution either explicitly or implicitly bestows on a prisoner the right to
be imprisoned where he wishes, the right to be rehabilitated, the right
not to be placed in solitary confinement for a legitimate purpose, or the
right to be transferred from state prison to a federal prison.
If it is determined that the class is not suspect and that the right
involved is not fundamental, the treatment accorded the prisoner must
be sustained if "the classification itself is rationally related to a legiti-
mate government interest."4
Initially the question is whether there is a relationship between the
classification of prisoners whom the corrections officials will not volun-
tarily transfer and a legitimate government interest. To meet this
argument the state need show only that the practice of allowing transfer
to some prisoners who are endangered is reasonably related to the legiti-
mate goal of providing physical safety for them. There is, as the state
would argue, no absolute deprivation of security for any prisoner. All
prisoners are protected from physical attacks; only the means differ,
and those means are unobjectionable in themselves. There is no con-
stitutional duty to administer absolutely equal treatment to prisoners.
Besides, since it is always within the discretion of state prison officials
to sanction a transfer, no state prisoner in protective isolation, however
financially resourceful, has a guarantee that he will be transferred. It
is not the prerogative of the prisoner to determine what is in his own
best interests.
However, the question of classifications must be further refined. In
the situation where a prisoner has been told he will be transferred if he
or his family will bear the costs, the prison officials have forfeited all
48 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
-zSee notes 27-28 supra & text accompanying. The only possible fundamental right
which such a situation violates may be the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
-
8United States Dep't Qf Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
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penological reasons for their refusal to transfer. The sole rationale for
the refusal is the cost involved. In essence, the question becomes not one
of a rational relationship of classification to the governmental interest;
rather the question becomes one of the legitimacy of the governmental
interest.
In recent years cost has not fared well as a justification for unequal
treatment. In Reed v. Reed the Supreme Court refu°sed to allow the cost
of holding hearings on the merits of applications to administer an estate
to justify the preferential treatment accorded male applicants.49 More-
over, cost has often been urged and rejected as a justification for not
requiring changes in prison conditions."0 Given the fact that the number
of prisoners who must be confined in solitary for long periods for pro-
tective reasons is small, the courts may be willing to require equal treat-
ment for both rich and poor prisoners alike since the aggregate expense
involved is relatively small. Allowing a classification based on wealth
to stand in such a context would be unreasonable.
It must be noted, however, that there is no direct authority which
challenges this practice of prison officials. Since many courts are still
reluctant to interfere with the discretion of prison officials, it is perhaps
the most informed practical judgment to conclude that a prisoner seeking
transfer is left with little effective recourse absent reprehensible conduct
on the part of prison officials. Such a prisoner must abide by the discre-
tion of those officials. If he has any hope it is that the legislature will
some day take some action for his benefit.
DALE M. IWATAKI
49404 U.S. 71 (1971). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).9
°See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) ; Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d .304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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